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Abstract. Goldwasser and Micali (1984) highlighted the importance of randomizing the plaintext for
public-key encryption and introduced the notion of semantic security. They also realized a cryptosystem
meeting this security notion under the standard complexity assumption of deciding quadratic residuosity
modulo a composite number. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is simple and elegant but is quite
wasteful in bandwidth when encrypting large messages. A number of works followed to address this issue
and proposed various modifications.
This paper revisits the original Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem using 2k -th power residue symbols. The
so-obtained cryptosystems appear as a very natural generalization for k ≥ 2 (the case k  1 corresponds
exactly to the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem). Advantageously, they are efficient in both bandwidth and
speed; in particular, they allow for fast decryption. Further, the cryptosystems described in this paper
inherit the useful features of the original cryptosystem (like its homomorphic property) and are shown to
be secure under a similar complexity assumption. As a prominent application, this paper describes an
efficient lossy trapdoor function based thereon.
Keywords: Public-key encryption, quadratic residuosity, Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, homomorphic
encryption, standard model.
1 Introduction
Encryption is arguably one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. Although it seems an
easy task to identify properties that a good encryption schememust fulfill, it turns out that rigorously
defining the right security notion is not trivial at all. Security is context sensitive. Merely requiring
that the plaintext cannot be recovered from the ciphertext is not enough in most applications. One
may require that the knowledge of some a priori information on the plaintext does not help the
adversary to obtain any new information, that is, beyond what can be obtained from the a priori
information. This intuition is formally captured by the notion of semantic security, introduced in
a seminal paper by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]. They also introduced the equivalent notion
of indistinguishability of encryptions, which is usually easier to work with. Given the encryption
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of any two equal-length (distinct) plaintexts, an adversary should not be able to distinguish the
corresponding ciphertexts.
Clearly, the latter notion is only achievable by probabilistic encryption schemes. One such
cryptosystem was also presented in [GM84]. It achieves ciphertext indistinguishability under the
Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption. Informally, this assumption says that it is infeasible to
distinguish squares from non-squares in JN (i.e., the set of elements in Z∗N whose Jacobi symbol
is +1) where N  pq is an RSA-type modulus of unknown factorization.
The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is simple and elegant. The public key comprises an RSA
modulusN  pq and a non-square y ∈ JN while the private key is the secret factor p. The encryption
of a bit m ∈ {0, 1} is given by c  ym x2 mod N for a random x ∈ Z∗N . The message m is recovered
using p, by checking whether c is a square: m  0 if so, and m  1 otherwise —observe that a
non-square y ∈ JN is also a non-square modulo p. The encryption of a bitstringm  (mk−1 , . . . ,m0)2,
with mi ∈ {0, 1}, proceeds by forming the ciphertexts ci  ymi x2 mod N, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. The
scheme is computationally efficient but somewhat wasteful in bandwidth as k · log2 N bits are
needed to encrypt a k-bit message. Several proposals were made to address this issue.
A first attempt is due to Blum andGoldwasser [BG84]. They achieve a better ciphertext expansion:
the ciphertext has the same length as the plaintext plus an integer of the size of the modulus.
The scheme is proved semantically secure assuming the unpredictability of the output of the
Blum-Blum-Shub’s pseudo-random generator [BBS82,BBS86], which resides on the factorization
hardness assumption. Details about this scheme can be found in [Gol04].
Another direction, put forward by Benaloh and Fischer [CF85,Ben87], is to use a k-bit prime r
such that r | p − 1, r2 - p − 1 and r - q − 1. The scheme also requires y ∈ Z∗N such that yφ(N)/r . 1
(mod N), where φ(N)  (p − 1)(q − 1) denotes Euler’s totient function. A k-bit message m (with
m < r) is encrypted as c  ym xr mod N , where x ∈R Z∗N . It is recovered by searching over the entire
message space, [0, r) ⊆ {0, 1}k , for the element m satisfying (yφ(N)/r )m ≡ cφ(N)/r (mod N). The
scheme is shown to be secure under the prime-residuosity assumption (which generalizes the quadratic
residuosity assumption). With the Benaloh-Fischer cryptosystem, the ciphertext corresponding to
a k-bit message is short but the decryption process is now demanding. In practice, the scheme is
therefore limited to small values of k, say k < 40.
The Benaloh-Fischer cryptosystem was subsequently extended by Naccache and Stern [NS98].
They observe that the decryption can be sped up by rather considering a product of small (odd)
primes R 
∏
i ri such that ri | φ(N) but ri2 - φ(N) for each prime ri . Given a ciphertext, the
plaintext m is reconstructed from mi B m mod ri through Chinese remaindering. The advantage is
that each mi is searched in the subspace [0, ri) instead of the entire message space. A variant of this
technique was used by Groth [Gro05].
Other generalizations and extensions of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem but without formal
security analysis can be found in [ZMI88,KKOT90,PLW95]. In [MV04b,MV04a], Monnerat and
Vaudenay developed applications using the more general theory of characters, specifically with
characters of order ≤ 4. Related cryptosystems are described in [SW95,Sch98]. A different approach
was proposed by Okamoto and Uchiyama [OU98], who suggested to use moduli of the form
N  p2q. This allows encrypting messages of size up to log2 p bits. This was later extended by
Paillier [Pai99] to the setting N  p2q2; see also [CGHGN01,DJN10].
A useful application of additive homomorphic encryption schemes resides in the construction
of lossy trapdoor functions (or LTDFs in short). These functions, as introduced by Peikert and
Waters [PW08], are function families wherein injective functions are computationally indistin-
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guishable from lossy functions, which lose many bits of information about their input. LTDFs
have proved to be very powerful and versatile in the cryptographer’s toolbox. They notably imply
chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption [PW08], deterministic encryption [BBO07,BFO08],
as well as cryptosystems that retain some security in the absence of reliable randomness [BBN+09]
or in the presence of selective-opening adversaries [BHY09].
Our contributions
New Homomorphic Cryptosystem. We suggest an improvement of the original Goldwasser-Micali
cryptosystem. It can be seen as a follow-up of the earlier works due to Benaloh and Fischer [CF85]
and Naccache and Stern [NS98]. Before discussing it, we quote from [NS98]:
“Although the question of devising new public-key cryptosystems appears much more difficult [. . . ]
we feel that research in this direction is still in order: simple yet efficient constructions may have been
overlooked.”
It is striking that the generalized cryptosystem in this paper was not already proposed because, as
will become apparent (cf. Section 3), it turns out to be a very natural generalization. Our approach
consists in considering nth-power residues modulo N with n  2k (the Goldwasser-Micali system
corresponds to the case k  1). This presents many advantages. First, the resulting cryptosystem
is bandwidth-efficient. Only log2 N bits are needed for encrypting a k-bit message in typical
applications (e.g., using the KEM/DEM paradigm). Second, the decryption process is fast. Searches
are no longer needed (not even in smaller subspaces) in the decryption algorithm as plaintext
messages can be recovered bit by bit. Further, although asymptotically slower than in Paillier’s
cryptosystem, the decryption process turns out to achieve comparable performance for most
practical values of k (e.g., k ≤ 128). As a last advantage, the underlying complexity assumptions are
similar to that used by Goldwasser and Micali. The proposed cryptosystem is shown to be secure
under the quadratic residuosity assumption for RSA moduli N  pq such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and
q ≡ 3 (mod 4). When q . 3 (mod 4), it assumes in addition the hardness of determining the Jacobi
symbol of an element y ∈ Z∗N given a pair (x ,N) where x  y2 mod N. Although the proposed
cryptosystem makes use of primes of special form, there are no known factoring algorithms taking
advantage of that. Further, complexity-wise, the use of such special primes does not incur penalty
with the latest prime generation algorithms. As will be seen, the time required to generate a random
prime p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) is essentially the same as the time required to generate a random, form-free
prime.
We also note that, similarly to theGoldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, our generalized cryptosystem
enjoys an additive property known as homomorphic encryption. If c1 and c2 denote two ciphertexts
corresponding to k-bit plaintexts m1 and m2, respectively, then c1 · c2 (mod N) is an encryption of
the message m1 + m2 (mod 2k ). This reveals useful in several applications like voting schemes.
As another useful property, the new scheme inherits the selective opening security5 [DNRS03,
BHY09] of the Goldwasser-Micali system (in the sense of a simulation-based definition given
in [BHY09]). We actually prove its semantic security by showing that its public key is indistin-
guishable from a so-called lossy key for which encryptions reveal nothing about the encrypted
message.
5 This notion refers to an attack scenario where the adversary is given t encryptions of possibly correlated messages,
opens t/2 out of these (and thereby obtains the messages and encryption coins) before attempting to harm the security
of the remaining ciphertexts.
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We thus believe our system to provide an interesting competitor to Paillier’s cryptosystem for
certain applications. As a salient example, we show that it provides a dramatically improved lossy
trapdoor function.
New Efficient Lossy Trapdoor Functions. The initial LTDF realizations [PW08] were based on
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Learning-with-Error (LWE) [Reg09] assumptions. More
efficient examples based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption were given
in [BFO08,FGK+10,FGK+13] while Kiltz et al. [KOS10] showed that the RSA permutation provides
a lossy function. Under the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption, three distinct constructions
were put forth in [HO12,FGK+10,FGK+13,Wee12]. Those of Freeman et al. [FGK+10,FGK+13] and
of Wee [Wee12] must be used in combination with the results of Mol and Yilek [MY10] as they
only lose single bits of information about the input. Hemenway and Ostrovsky [HO12] suggested
a more efficient realization, of which Wee’s framework [Wee12] is a generalization. While their
QR-based LTDF has found applications in the design of deterministic encryption schemes [BS11], it
is conceptually very similar to the Peikert-Waters matrix-based schemes and suffers from similarly
large outputs and descriptions.
We show that our variant of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem drastically improves the
efficiency of theHemenway-OstrovskyLTDF. Specifically, it reduces both the length of the output and
the description of the function. By appropriately selecting the parameters, we obtain evaluation keys
and outputs consisting of a constant number of Z∗N elements. We thus get a DDH/QR-based LTDF,
whose efficiency is competitive with Paillier-based realizations [BFO08,FGK+10,FGK+13]. These
improvements carry over to the deterministic encryption setting, when the Hemenway-Ostrovsky
LTDF is used as a building block of the Brakerski-Segev system [BS11].
Outline of the paper
In the next section, we introduce some mathematical background and review some complexity
assumptions. In Section 3, we present our generalized cryptosystem. We prove its security in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses certain implementation aspects. In Section 6, we describe our new
lossy trapdoor function. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
We review some useful background and fix the notation. In particular, we define the n-th power
residue symbol. We refer the reader to [IR90, Sho10, Yan02] for further details on (quadratic)
residuosity. More information about encryption schemes can be found in textbooks in cryptography;
e.g. [Gol04,KL07].
2.1 General notation
The set of non-negative integers is denoted by N. For any integer N ≥ 2, ZN denotes the ring of
integers modulo N , and Z∗N denotes its group of units. The order of Z
∗
N is φ(N), where φ is Euler’s
totient function.
For any positive integer N and any integer a, a mod N represents the smallest integer in the set
{0, . . . ,N −1} that is congruent to a modulo N . Furthermore, for any positive odd integer N and any
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integer a, a mods N represents the absolute smallest residue of a modulo N —note the “s” ending
the “mod” operator. The complete set of absolute smallest residues is {−(N − 1)/2, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . ,
(N − 1)/2}.
2.2 nth-power residues
Let N ≥ 2 be an integer. For each integer n ≥ 2, we define (Z∗N )n  {xn | x ∈ Z∗N } as the set of
nth-power residues modulo N . If the relation a  xn has no solution in Z∗N then a is called a n
th-power
non-residue modulo N .
Suppose that p is an odd prime. For any integer a with gcd(a , p)  1, it is easily verified that a is
a nth-power residue modulo p if and only if
a
p−1
gcd(n ,p−1) ≡ 1 (mod p) .
When n  2 (and so gcd(n , p − 1)  2), this is known as Euler’s criterion. It allows one to
distinguish quadratic residues from quadratic non-residues. This defines the Legendre symbol:(
a
p
)

1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo p−1 if a is a quadratic non-residue modulo p .
There are several ways to generalize the Legendre symbol (see [Lem00]). In this paper, we consider
the n-th power residue symbol for a divisor n of (p − 1), as presented in [Yan02, Definition 1.6.21].
Definition 1. Let p be an odd prime and let n ≥ 2 such that n | p − 1. Then the symbol(
a
p
)
n
 a
p−1
n mods p
is called the n-th power residue symbol modulo p.
It satisfies the following properties. Let a and b be two integers that are co-prime to p. Then:
1. If a ≡ b (mod p) then
(
a
p
)
n

(
b
p
)
n
;
2.
(
an
p
)
n
 1;
3.
(
ab
p
)
n

(
a
p
)
n
(
b
p
)
n
mods p;
4.
(
1
p
)
n
 1 and
(−1
p
)
n
 (−1) p−1n .
2.3 Quadratic residuosity
Let N  pq be the product of two (odd) primes p and q. For an integer a co-prime to N , the Jacobi
symbol is the product of the corresponding Legendre symbols, namely
(
a
N
)

(
a
p
) (
a
q
)
. This gives rise
to the multiplicative group JN of integers whose Jacobi symbol is +1, JN 
{
a ∈ Z∗N |
(
a
N
)
 1
}
. A
relevant subset of JN is the set of quadratic residues modulo N ,QRN 
{
a ∈ Z∗N |
(
a
p
)

(
a
q
)
 1
}
. The
set of integers whose Jacobi symbol is −1 is denoted by JN ; i.e., JN  {a ∈ Z∗N | ( aN)  −1}  Z∗N \ JN .
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TheQuadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption says that, given a random element a ∈ JN , it is hard to
decide whether a ∈ QRN if the prime factors of N are unknown. To emphasize that this should hold
for RSA moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) for some k ≥ 1, we refer to it as the k-QR assumption.
Formally, we have:
Definition 2 (Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, k-QR). Let RSAGen be a probabilistic algorithm
which, given a security parameter κ, outputs primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), and their product
N  pq. The Quadratic Residuosity (k-QR) assumption asserts that the function Advk-QRD (κ), defined as
the distance Pr[D(x ,N)  1 | x R← QRN ] − Pr[D(x ,N)  1 | x R← JN \QRN ]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of running (N, p , q) ← RSAGen(1κ) and choosing at random x ∈ QRN and x ∈ JN \QRN .
We also introduce a new assumption. The new assumption, which we call the Squared Jacobi
Symbol (SJS) assumption, posits the infeasibility of determining whether
( y
N
)
 1 or −1 given (x ,N)
where x  y2 mod N. Again, when the assumption is directed to RSA moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1
(mod 2k ), we write it k-SJS. Formally, we define:
Definition 3 (Squared Jacobi Symbol Assumption, k-SJS). Let RSAGen be a probabilistic algorithm
which, given a security parameter κ, outputs primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), and their product
N  pq. The Squared Jacobi Symbol (k-SJS) assumption asserts that the function Advk-SJSD (κ), defined
as the distancePr[D(y2 mod N,N)  1 | y R← JN ] − Pr[D(y2 mod N,N)  1 | y R← JN ]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of running (N, p , q) ← RSAGen(1κ) and choosing at random y ∈ JN and y ∈ JN .
When q ≡ 3 (mod 4), any element x ∈ QRN has four square roots: two of Jacobi symbol +1
and two of Jacobi symbol −1. In that case, as detailed in Section 3.3, the k-SJS assumption holds
perfectly.
3 A New Public-Key Encryption Scheme
We generalize the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem so that it can efficiently support the encryption
of larger messages while remaining additively homomorphic.
3.1 Description
The setting is basically the same as for the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. The only additional
requirement is that the prime p is chosen congruent to 1modulo 2k , where k denotes the bit-size of
the messages being encrypted. The case k  1 (i.e., encryption of 1-bit messages) corresponds to the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
In more detail, our encryption scheme is the tuple (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) defined as follows.
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KeyGen(1κ) Given a security parameter κ, KeyGen defines an integer k ≥ 1, randomly generates
primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), and sets N  pq. It also picks a random y ∈ JN \QRN .
The public and private keys are pk  {N, y , k} and sk  {p}, respectively.
Encrypt(pk,m) LetM  {0, 1}k . To encrypt a message m ∈ M (seen as an integer in {0, . . . , 2k − 1}),
Encrypt picks a random x ∈ Z∗N and returns the ciphertext c  ym x2
k mod N .
Decrypt(sk, c) Given c ∈ Z∗N and the private key sk  {p}, the algorithm first computes z 
(
c
p
)
2k
and
then finds m ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1} such that the relation
z 
[( y
p
)
2k
]m
mods p
holds. A fast decryption algorithm is detailed in Section 3.2.
The correctness of the decryption is easily verified by observing that α B
(y
p
)
2k
has order 2k as
an element in Z∗p . Indeed, letting n  ordp (α) the order of α, we have n | 2k since, by definition,
α ≡ y
p−1
2k (mod p). But n cannot be equal to 2k′ for some k′ < k because α2k
′ ≡ 1 (mod p) would
imply y
p−1
2 ≡ 1 (mod p), which contradicts the assumption that y ∈ JN \QRN ⇐⇒
(y
p
)

(y
q
)
 −1.
The decryption algorithm recovers the unique m ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1} such that αm ≡ z (mod p).
Furthermore, the scheme is homomorphic for the addition modulo 2k : if c1  ym1 x12
k and
c2  ym2 x22
k are ciphertexts of m1 and m2 respectively, then c1 · c2  ym1+m2 (x1x2)2k mod N is a
ciphertext of m1 + m2 (mod 2k ).
3.2 Fast decryption
At first glance, from the above description, it seems that the decryption process amounts to a search
through the entire message space {0, 1}k , similarly to some earlier cryptosystems. But we can do
better. One of the main advantages of the proposed cryptosystem is that it provides an efficient
way to recover the message. Hence, it remains practical, even for large values of k. The decryption
algorithm proceeds similarly to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78].
Themessagem ∈ {0, 1}k is viewed as a k-bit integer given by its binary expansionm  ∑k−1i0 mi 2i ,
with mi ∈ {0, 1}. Given c  ymx2k mod N , we have(
c
p
)
2i
 *,
ymx2
k
p
+-2i  *.,
y
∑i−1
j0 m j 2
j
p
+/-2i 
( y
p
)∑i−1
j0 m j 2
j
2i
mods p
since ymx2k  y
∑i−1
j0 m j 2
j · (y∑k−1ji m j 2 j−ix2k−i )2i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. As a result, m can be recovered bit by bit
using p, starting from the least significant bit. Implementation details are provided in Section 5.2.
3.3 Security analysis
We focus on semantic security. The case k  1 corresponds to the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Indeed, when k  1, the 2k-th power residue symbol is then the classical Legendre symbol
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and the assumption p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) is trivially verified. The Goldwasser-Micali scheme has
indistinguishable encryptions under the standard Quadratic Residuosity assumption.
In the general case (i.e., k ≥ 1), we prove that the scheme provides indistinguishable encryptions
(IND-CPA security) under the k-QR and k-SJS assumptions. More precisely:
Theorem 1. Let κ denote the security parameter. For any IND-CPA adversary A against the scheme of
Section 3.1, there exist a k-QR distinguisherD1 and a k-SJS distinguisherD2 with comparable running
times and such that
Advind-cpaA (κ) ≤ 32
(
(k − 13 ) ·Advk-QRD1 (κ) + (k − 1) ·Advk-SJSD2 (κ)
)
.
Proof. The proof is given in Section 4. uunionsq
When k  1, the theorem reads Advind-cpaA (κ) ≤ AdvQRD1 (κ), as shown in [GM84].
We henceforth assume k ≥ 2. When k ≥ 2, the condition p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) implies p ≡ 1 (mod 4).
Depending on q, there are two possible sub-cases. If q ≡ 1 (mod 4) then −1 is a square modulo p
and modulo q. The square roots of any element of QRN then all have the same Jacobi symbol
modulo N . The hardness to distinguish among them is captured by the k-SJS assumption.
The sub-case q ≡ 3 (mod 4) is more interesting. We then have
(−1
N
)
 −1. As a consequence, by
definition of the Jacobi symbol, it follows that{
y2 mod N | y ∈ JN
}

{
y2 mod N |
( y
N
)
 −1
}

{
(−y)2 mod N |
(−y
N
)
 −1
}

{
y2 mod N | −
( y
N
)
 −1
}

{
y2 mod N | y ∈ JN
}
.
Since the two sets are identical, the k-SJS assumption holds perfectly when q ≡ 3 (mod 4). This in
turn leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. When q ≡ 3 (mod 4), for any IND-CPA adversaryA against the scheme of Section 3.1, there
exists a k-QR distinguisherD with comparable running time and such that
Advind-cpaA (κ) ≤ 12 (3k − 1) ·Advk-QRD (κ) .
Proof. First observe that the bound is valid for k  1. For k ≥ 2, the corollary follows by letting
D1  D and plugging Advk-SJSD2 (κ)  0 in the bound of Theorem 1. uunionsq
The bound in Corollary 1 can be slightly tightened by a more direct proof. We have:
Theorem 2. Let κ denote the security parameter. For any IND-CPA adversary A against the scheme of
Section 3.1 with q ≡ 3 (mod 4), there exists a k-QR distinguisherD with comparable running time and
such that
Advind-cpaA (κ) ≤ 12 (k + 1) ·Advk-QRD (κ) .
Proof. The proof is given in appendix. uunionsq
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Comparing the security bounds offered by Theorems 1 and 2, it turns out that RSA moduli
N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4) should be preferred over RSA moduli with q ≡ 1
(mod 4). More importantly, selecting RSA moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
presents the advantage that the security solely relies on a QR-based assumption (namely, the k-QR
assumption).
Regarding the weaker notion of one-wayness, it is easy to see that one-wayness can be proved
just under the k-QR assumption in all cases. Let B be an adversary which returns m when given
c  ymx2
k mod N and N (with x
R← Z∗N ). We construct a distinguisherD for the k-QR assumption
as follows. It takes as input an RSA modulus N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and an element w ∈ Z∗N .
Its goal is to distinguish whether w ∈ QRN or w ∈ JN \QRN . To do this,D simply picks a random
x ∈ Z∗N , sets c  wx2 mod N, and feeds B with (c ,N). When the latter outputs a result m, D
outputs the least significant bit of m. It is clear that if w ∈ QRN , c is a ciphertext of an even
plaintext; otherwise, c is a ciphertext of an odd plaintext. Hence if B is a successful attacker against
one-wayness,D is a successful distinguisher for k-QR.
4 Security Proof
4.1 Gap 2k-residuosity assumption
The k-QR assumption states that, without knowing the factorization of N, random elements of
QRN are computationally indistinguishable from random elements of JN \QRN . Here, it will be
convenient to consider a gap variant of the k-QR assumption. We chose the terminology “gap” (not
to be confused with computational problems which have an easy decisional counterpart [OP01]) by
analogy with certain lattice problems, where not every instance is a yes or no instance since a gap
exists between these.
Definition 4 (Gap 2k-Residuosity Assumption,Gap 2k-Res). LetRSAGen be a probabilistic algorithm
which, given a security parameter κ, outputs primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ). The Gap
2k-Residuosity problem in Z∗N consists in distinguishing a uniform element of V0 from a uniform element of
V1 given only N  pq, where V0 and V1 are defined as follows:
V0 
{
x ∈ JN \QRN } and V1  {y2k mod N | y ∈ Z∗N } .
The Gap 2k-Residuosity (Gap 2k-Res) assumption posits that the advantage AdvGap 2
k -Res
D (κ), defined as
the distance Pr[D(x , k ,N)  1 | x R← V0] − Pr[D(x , k ,N)  1 | x R← V1]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of running (N, p , q) ← RSAGen(1κ) and choosing x R← V0 and x R← V1.
The latter assumption was independently considered in [ABP13] by Abdalla, Ben Hamouda and
Pointcheval who used it to provide tighter security proofs for forward-secure signatures.
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4.2 Gap 2k-Res is implied by k-QR and k-SJS
We now investigate the relationship between the Gap 2k-Residuosity assumption and other more
natural assumptions; namely, we will show that Gap 2k-Res is implied by the k-QR and k-SJS
assumptions.
For this proof, it is useful to introduce two intermediate assumptions: the “special” k-QR
assumption and the “special” k-SJS assumption.
Definition 5 (Special Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, k-QR?). Let RSAGen be a probabilistic
algorithm which, given a security parameter κ, outputs primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), and
their product N  pq. The Special Quadratic Residuosity (k-QR?) assumption asserts that the function
Advk-QR
?
D (κ), defined as the distancePr[D(x ,N)  1 | x  y2 mod N, y R← JN ] − Pr[D(x ,N)  1 | x R← JN \QRN ]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of running (N, p , q) ← RSAGen(1κ) and choosing at random y ∈ JN and x ∈ JN \QRN .
Definition 6 (Special Squared Jacobi Symbol Assumption, k-SJS?). Let RSAGen be a probabilistic
algorithm which, given a security parameter κ, outputs primes p and q such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), and
their product N  pq. The Special Squared Jacobi Symbol (k-SJS?) assumption asserts that the function
Advk-SJS?D (κ), defined as the distancePr[D(y2 mod N,N)  1 | y R← JN \QRN ] − Pr[D(y2 mod N,N)  1 | y R← JN ]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of running (N, p , q) ← RSAGen(1κ) and choosing at random y ∈ JN \QRN and y ∈ JN .
Lemma 1. Using the previous notation, we have k-QR + k-SJS ⇒ k-QR? + k-SJS?. More precisely,
for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisherA against k-QR? or k-SJS?,A is also a distinguisher
against k-QR or k-SJS and there exists a distinguisher B against k-QR with comparable running time, such
that
Advk-QR
?
A (κ) ≤ Advk-QRA (κ) + 12 Advk-SJSA (κ) ,
Advk-SJS
?
A (κ) ≤ Advk-SJSA (κ) + 12 Advk-QRB (κ) .
Proof. Consider a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A taking as input N and x ∈ JN . For
x
R← JN , we let 
1  Pr[A(x ,N)  1 | x ∈ JN \QRN ]
′2  Pr[A(x ,N)  1 | x  y2 ∈ QRN ∧ y ∈ JN \QRN ]
′′2  Pr[A(x ,N)  1 | x  y2 ∈ QRN ∧ y ∈ QRN ]
3  Pr[A(x ,N)  1 | x  y2 ∈ QRN ∧ y ∈ JN ]
.
Against k-QR, k-SJS, k-QR?, and k-SJS?, its advantage is denoted
α1 B
1 − 14 (′2 + ′′2 ) − 123 , α2 B 12 (′2 + ′′2 ) − 3 , α3 B 1 − 12 (′2 + ′′2 ) , α4 B ′2 − 3 ,
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respectively.
We have to show that if the k-QR and k-SJS assumptions hold then so do the k-QR? and k-SJS?
assumptions. The k-QR and k-SJS assumptions imply that α1 and α2 are negligible. We also note
that any significant difference between ′2 and 
′′
2 would lead to a distinguisher against k-QR. We
thus have |′2 − ′′2 | ≤ Advk-QRB (κ), with B an algorithm with running time comparable to that ofA.
From the definitions of α3 and α4, we can write
α3 
1 − 12 (′2 + ′′2 )  1 − 14 (′2 + ′′2 ) − 123 + 123 − 14 (′2 + ′′2 )
≤ 1 − 14 (′2 + ′′2 ) − 123 + 123 − 14 (′2 + ′′2 )
 α1 + 12Adv
k-QR
B (κ)
and
α4 
′2 − 3  12′2 + 12′′2 − 3 + 12′2 − 12′′2  ≤ 12 (′2 + ′′2 ) − 3 + 12 (′2 − ′′2 )
≤ α2 + 12α1 .
The previous inequalities show that when α1 and α2 are negligible then so are α3 and α4. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (k-QR + k-SJS ⇒ Gap 2k-Res). For RSA moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), the Gap
2k-Res assumption holds if the k-QR assumption and the k-SJS assumption hold. More precisely, for any
probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher B against the former, there exist a k-QR distinguisherD1 and a
k-SJS distinguisherD2 with comparable running times and for which
AdvGap 2
k -Res
B (κ) ≤ 32
(
(k − 13 ) ·Advk-QRD1 (κ) + (k − 1) ·Advk-SJSD2 (κ)
)
.
Proof. To prove the result, we consider a sequence of distributions which will help us bridge the
gap between the assumptions. More precisely, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, we consider the subsets Di of JN
given by
Di 
{
y2
i mod N | y ∈ JN \QRN } .
We also need other subsets which can be seen as the complement of Di in the set of 2i-th residues
that are not 2i+1-th residues:
D′i 
{
y2
i mod N | y ∈ JN } .
Finally we define the subgroup of 2k-th residues, Rk  {y2k mod N | y ∈ Z∗N }.
If we consider the sets V0 and V1 (presented in Definition 4), we have V0  D0 and V1  Rk . The
proof will actually proceed by showing the computational indistinguishability of the (uniform)
distributions induced by the corresponding subsets. Namely, unless either the k-QR? assumption
or the k-SJS? assumption is false, we will prove
D0
c≈ D′1
c≈ D1 c≈ D′2
c≈ D2 c≈ · · · c≈ D′k−1
c≈ Dk−1 ,
where the c≈ denotes computationally indistinguishable distributions. Finally, we also prove that
Dk−1
c≈ Rk unless the k-QR assumption is false.
Remark 1. Note that we abuse notation by using Di ,D′i , Rk both for subsets and for the uniform
distributions over them. Also, it is important to see that:
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– if y ∈R JN \QRN then y2i ∈R Di ;
– if y ∈R JN then y2i ∈R D′i ;
– if y ∈R Z∗N then y2
k ∈R Rk .
Claim 1. If k-QR? holds, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can
distinguish the distributions of Di−1 and D′i .
Proof (of Claim 1). LetD be a distinguisher that can tell apartDi−1 andD′i with non-negligible
advantage ε. We show thatD implies a k-QR? distinguisher B1,i with advantage ε for RSA
moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ).
Our distinguisher B1,i takes as input an RSA modulus N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and an
element w ∈ Z∗N which is drawn from one of the two distributions
dist0  {y2 mod N | y R← JN } , dist1  {y | y R← JN \QRN } .
Its task is to decide ifw is in dist0 or in dist1. To this end,B1,i chooses a randomelement z R← JN .
It then defines x  z2iw2i−1 mod N and feeds D with (x , i ,N). When the distinguisher D
halts, B1,i outputs whateverD outputs.
– First assume that w  y2 ∈ dist0, for some y ∈R JN . We have x  (zy)2i mod N . Further,
since z
R← JN , we have zy ∈ JN and thus x ∈R D′i .
– Now assume that w ∈R JN \ QRN . In this case, we clearly have x ∈R Di−1 because
x  (z2w)2i−1 mod N and z2w ∈ JN \QRN . 
Claim 2. If k-SJS? holds, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can
distinguish the distributions of D′i and Di .
Proof (of Claim 2). Let D be a distinguisher with non-negligible advantage ε between Di
and D′i . We show that D implies a k-SJS? distinguisher B2,i with advantage ε for RSA
moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ). Given w ∈ Z∗N which is drawn from one of the two
distributions
dist0  {y2 mod N | y R← JN \QRN } , dist1  {y2 mod N | y R← JN } ,
B2,i constructs x  w2i−1 mod N which is used to feed the distinguisherD. When the latter
outputs a result,B2,i produces the same output. It is clear that, if w ∈R dist0 (resp. w ∈R dist1),
then x ∈R Di (resp. x ∈R D′i ). Hence, ifD is a successful distinguisher, so is B2,i . 
Claim 3. If k-QR holds, no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the distributions
of Dk−1 and Rk .
Proof (of Claim 3).LetD be an algorithm that can distinguishDk−1 andRk with non-negligible
advantage. We build a k-QR distinguisher B3 out ofD with the same advantage.
Algorithm B3 takes as input N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) as well as an element w ∈ JN
with the goal of deciding whether w ∈ QRN or w ∈ JN \QRN . To do this, B3 simply defines
x  w2
k−1 mod N and feeds D with (x , k ,N). When D halts and outputs b ∈ {0, 1}, B3
outputs the same bit.
It is easy to see that, if w ∈R QRN then w  y2 mod N for a random y ∈R Z∗N , and so
x  (y2k mod N) ∈R Rk —see Remark 1. If w ∈R JN \QRN , we immediately have x ∈R Dk−1.

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To conclude the proof of the theorem, we remark that, if a probabilistic polynomial-time
distinguisher B exists for the Gap 2k-Res assumption (i.e., if D0 6 c≈ Rk), then
– either Dk−1 6 c≈ Rk , contradicting k-QR (Claim 3); or
– there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 such that D′i 6
c≈ Di−1 or D′i 6
c≈ Di . The above arguments show that either
situation would contradict the k-QR? assumption (Claim 1) or the k-SJS? assumption (Claim 2)
—or by Lemma 1, the k-QR assumption or the k-SJS assumption.
More precisely, to get the bound given in Theorem 3, we consider B′2,i the adversary “B” defined
in Lemma 1 when “A  B2,i”, and we define the distinguisher D1 (resp. D2) as follows: it picks
(α, i)
R← P1 (resp. (α, i) R← P2), where P1 and P2 are probability distributions defined as:
Pr
(X,Y)
R←P1
[(X,Y)  (α, i)] 

2
3k−1 if α  1 and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
1
3k−1 if α  2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
2
3k−1 if α  3
and
Pr
(X,Y)
R←P2
[(X,Y)  (α, i)] 

1
3k−3 if α  1 and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
2
3k−3 if α  2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
.
ThenD1 runs B1,i when α  1, B′2,i when α  2, and B3 when α  3, and outputs what this latter
adversary outputs. Similarly,D2 runs Bα,i , and outputs what this latter adversary outputs.
Using Lemma 1, we have:
AdvGap 2
k -Res
B (κ) ≤
k−1∑
i1
Advk-QR
?
B1,i (κ) +
k−1∑
i1
Advk-SJS
?
B2,i (κ) +Adv
k-QR
B3 (κ)
≤ *,
k−1∑
i1
Advk-QRB1,i (κ) +
1
2
k−1∑
i1
Advk-QRB′2,i
(κ) +Advk-QRB3 (κ)
+- +*,12
k−1∑
i1
Advk-SJSB1,i (κ) +
k−1∑
i1
Advk-SJSB2,i (κ)
+-

3k − 1
2 Adv
k-QR
D1 (κ) +
3k − 3
2 Adv
k-SJS
D2 (κ) .
In addition, we note thatD1 andD2 have comparable running times to B. uunionsq
We remark that the assumption p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) is never directly used in the proof. The
assumption p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) is just needed for the correctness of our encryption scheme. The
security proof actually holds for any kind of modulus N for which the QR and the SJS assumptions
hold —the k-QR and the k-SJS assumptions are just the QR and the SJS assumptions for moduli
N  pq such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ).
4.3 Semantic security
It is not hard to see that the semantic security of the scheme is equivalent to the Gap 2k-Res
assumption. From Theorem 3, we thus obtain the result announced in Theorem 1. Namely, for any
IND-CPA adversaryA, there exist a k-QR distinguisherD1 and a k-SJS distinguisherD2 such that
Advind-cpaA (κ) ≤ 32
(
(k − 13 ) ·Advk-QRD1 (κ) + (k − 1) ·Advk-SJSD2 (κ)
)
.
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Proof (of Theorem 1). The proof proceeds by simply changing the distribution of the public key.
Under the Gap 2k-Res assumption, instead of picking y uniformly in JN \QRN , we can choose it in
the subgroup of 2k-th residues without the adversary noticing. However, in this case, the ciphertext
carries no information about the message and the IND-CPA security follows. uunionsq
Interestingly, the security proof implicitly shows that, like the original Goldwasser-Micali system,
our scheme is a lossy encryption scheme [BHY09] (i.e., it admits an alternative distribution of public
keys for which encryptions statistically hide the plaintext), which provides security guarantees
against selective-opening attacks [DNRS03]. Moreover, for a lossy key (y ,N), there exists an efficient
algorithm that opens a given ciphertext c to any arbitrary plaintext m (by using the factorization of
N to find random coins that explain c as an encryption of m). It implies that our scheme satisfies
the simulation-based definition [BHY09] of selective-opening security.
5 Implementation and Performance
We tackle here some implementation aspects. We explain how to select the parameters involved in
the system set-up and key generation. We present fast decryption algorithms. Finally, we discuss
the ciphertext expansion and give a comparison with previous schemes.
5.1 Parameter selection
The key generation (cf. Section 3.1) requires a prime p such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) for some k ≥ 1
and a random element y ∈ JN \ QRN , where N  pq. The condition y ∈ JN \ QRN is equivalent
to
(y
p
)

(y
q
)
 −1. Since a random nonzero element modulo p has a probability of exactly 12 of
being a quadratic non-residue modulo p (and similarly modulo q), a suitable y is likely to be
obtained after just a few trials. Efficient algorithms for generating a prime p lying in a prescribed
interval [pmin , pmax] can be found in [JPV00, JP06]. They can be adapted to accommodate the extra
condition p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) without increasing the time complexity, as a random number congruent
to 1modulo 2k in [pmin , pmax] is prime with approximatively the same probability than a random
odd number in [pmin , pmax], thanks to Dirichlet’s theorem. We describe such a variant below.
The goal is to produce a prime p  1+ 2kr for some r ∈ [rmin , rmax], where rmin  d(pmin − 1)/2ke
and rmax  b(pmax − 1)/2kc. Let Π  3 · 5 · 7 · · · ≤ rmax − rmin + 1 denote a product of small odd
primes. The algorithm will construct candidate primes that are automatically co-prime to Π. The
first step is to generate a random unit υ ∈ Z∗Π (for example using the efficient algorithm presented
in [JP06, § 2.2]). Define ϑ0  −
(
1
2k + rmin
)
mod Π. A candidate p is then formed as
p ← 1 + 2k (rmin + ϑ) for some ϑ ∈R [0, rmax − rmin] such that ϑ ≡ ϑ0 + υ (mod Π)
and tested for primality. If candidate p is not prime, υ is updated as υ ← 2υ mod Π and the process
is re-iterated. Since Π is odd, 2 ∈ Z∗Π and thus υ remains in Z∗Π after the updating step. Moreover,
reducing candidate p moduloΠ, we get p ≡ 1+ 2k (rmin + ϑ) ≡ 1+ 2k (rmin + ϑ0 + υ) ≡ 2kυ (mod Π)
and thus p ∈ Z∗Π since υ ∈ Z∗Π and 2k ∈ Z∗Π. Equivalently, p ∈ Z∗Π means that candidate p is such
that gcd(p , pi)  1 for all primes pi dividing Π (and p is also odd by construction).
A powerful LLL-based technique due to Coppersmith bounds the size of k to at most 12 log2 p bits
as, otherwise, the factors ofNwould be revealed [Cop97, Theorem5].Going beyondpolynomial-time
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attacks, one should add an extra security margin to take into account exhaustive searches [Ngu09].
RSA moduli being balanced (i.e., 12 log2 p 
1
4 log2 N), we so end up with the upper bound
k < 14 log2 N − κ
where κ is the security parameter.
In practice, this restriction on k is not a limitation because, as described in the next section,
long messages can be encrypted using the KEM/DEM paradigm. For example, using ECRYPT 2
recommendations [ECR12], for κ  128 bits of security, a symmetric key of k  128 bits has to be
used for the KEM/DEM paradigm, and a 3248-bit modulus N has to be used to ensure factorization
is hard. These parameters do not take into account the tightness of the reduction. If we take it into
account, when q ≡ 3 (mod 4), according to Theorem 2, a factor (k + 1)/2 ≈ 64  26 is lost in the
reduction. Assuming that the best way to solve the quadratic residuosity consists in factorizing the
modulus N , a 3584-bit modulus has to be used, as this corresponds to (128 + 6) bits of security for
factorization, according to [ECR12]. Note that the choice of parameters k  128 and |N |2  3584
satisfies the relation k < 14 log2 N − κ.
5.2 Optimized decryption algorithms
In its most basic version, the decryption requires O(k) full modular exponentiations in Z∗p in order
to compute higher power residue symbols. This section shows that a suitable pre-processing phase
allows increasing the decryption speed.
The RSA modulus used in the proposed cryptosystem is of the form N  pq with p ≡ 1
(mod 2k ). Hence, we can write p  2K p′ + 1 for some integer K ≥ k and some odd integer p′.
Now, given the public key pk  {N, y , k}, consider the ciphertext c  ym x2k mod N of message
m 
∑k−1
i0 mi 2i with mi ∈ {0, 1}. If, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we define Λ j  2K− jp′ then
cΛ j ≡ (ym x2k )Λ j ≡ ymΛ j x2K+k− jp′ ≡ ymΛ j mod 2Kp′ ≡ ymΛ j mod 2 jΛ j
≡ yΛ j (m mod 2 j ) ≡ yΛ j (m j−12 j−1+(m mod 2 j−1)) ≡
(
y
p−1
2
)m j−1
yΛ j (m mod 2
j−1)
≡ (−1)m j−1 yΛ j (m mod 2 j−1) (mod p) .
So, letting C  c2K−kp′ mod p andY  y2K−kp′ mod p, the previous relation becomes
(
C
Ym mod 2 j−1
)2k− j
≡
(−1)m j−1 (mod p). Starting at j  1 and iterating until j  k, it yields a decryption algorithm
producing one bit of plaintext m per iteration (i.e., bit m j−1).
To further speed-up the decryption, observing that Y  y2K−kp′ mod p is independent of the
ciphertext, its value —or better its inverse— can be pre-computed. The private key now consists
of the pair (p ,D) where D  y−2K−kp′ mod p. As one bit of plaintext m is correctly obtained per
iteration, there is no need to fully recompute Dm mod 2 j−1 mod p at iteration j. Rather, it can be
obtained more efficiently from the value of the previous iteration as
Dm mod 2
j−1 mod p 
D
m mod 2 j−2 mod p if m j−1  0
Dm mod 2
j−2
D2
j−1 mod p if m j−1  1
.
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We thus obtain:
Algorithm 1 Decryption algorithm
Input: Ciphertext c, private key (p ,D) with D  y−(p−1)/2k mod p, and public-key element k
Output: Plaintext m  (mk−1 , . . . ,m0)2
1: m← 0; B← 1; D← D
2: C← c(p−1)/2k mod p
3: for j  1 to k − 1 do
4: z← C2k− j mod p
5: if (z , 1) then m← m + B; C← C · D mod p
6: B← 2B; D← D2 mod p
7: end for
8: if (C , 1) then m← m + B
9: return m
Variable m in the for-loop contains the lowest part of the plaintext m and variable B contains the
successive powers of 2. Further, the for-loop is only performed until iteration k − 1 to save a couple
of operations. As a variant, we remark that D can be initialized to y−(p−1)/2k mod p (Line 1 in Alg. 1)
instead of being explicitly included in the private key.
As described, the for-loop in Alg. 1 on average involves
∑k−1
j1 (k − j)  (k−1)k2 modular squarings
for the successive evaluation of z, k−12 modular multiplications for the evaluation of C, and (k − 1)
modular squarings for updating D.
Remark 2. The decryption can even be made slightly faster. The condition z , 1 is equivalent to
z ≡ −1 (mod p). Instead of iteratively evaluating z← C2k− j mod p for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, we can set z
to C and successively square it, z← z2 mod p, until it becomes congruent to −1 (mod p). We then
update C by multiplying it by the corresponding power of D and redo the process until C becomes
equal to 1. On average, this halves the number of squarings for the successive evaluations of z.
Furthermore, the modular squarings for updating D can be saved by pre-computing the different
powers of D. This saves (k − 1) modular squarings. The total number of operations in the for-loop
then boils down to (k−1)k4 squarings plus
k−1
2 multiplications (on average), modulo p.
5.3 Ciphertext expansion
Hybrid encryption allows designing efficient asymmetric schemes, as suggested by Shoup in the
ISO 18033-2 standard for public-key encryption [ISO06]. An asymmetric cryptosystem is used to
encrypt a secret key that is then used to encrypt the actual message. This is the so-called KEM/DEM
paradigm.
The next table compares the ciphertext expansion in the encryption of k-bit messages for different
generalized Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystems. Only cryptosystems with a formal security analysis
are considered. Further, the value of k is assumed to be relatively small (e.g., 128 or 256) as the
“message” being encrypted is typically a symmetric key (for example a 128- or 256-bit AES key) in a
KEM/DEM construction.
It appears that the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem has the highest ciphertext expansion but
its semantic security relies on the standard quadratic residuosity assumption (i.e., RSA moduli
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Table 1. Ciphertext expansion in a typical encryption
Encryption scheme Assumption Ciphertext size
Goldwasser-Micali [GM84] Quadratic residuosity (QR) k · log2 N
Benaloh-Fisher [CF85] Prime residuosity (PR)
⌈
k
log2 r
⌉
· log2 N
Naccache-Stern [NS98] Prime residuosity (PR) log2 N
Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] p-subgroup log2 N
Paillier [Pai99] N-th residuosity 2 log2 N
This paper when q ≡ 1 (mod 4) Quadratic residuosity (k-QR)+ Squared Jacobi symbol (k-SJS) log2 N
This paper when q ≡ 3 (mod 4) Quadratic residuosity (k-QR) log2 N
N  pq involves form-free primes). The ciphertext expansion of the Benaloh-Fischer cryptosystem is
similar to that of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem for small messages; i.e., when k ≤ log2 r. For
larger messages, the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem should be preferred. It also offers the further
advantage of providing a faster decryption procedure. The same is true for the Okamoto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem and the Paillier cryptosystem. These two latter cryptosystems are particularly suited
to encrypt very large messages (i.e., up to 12 log2 N bits for the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem
and up to log2 N bits for the Paillier cryptosystem).
The encryption scheme proposed in this paper has the same ciphertext expansion as in the
Naccache-Stern cryptosystem. Moreover, its decryption algorithm is fast (no searches are needed),
requires less memory, and the security relies on a quadratic residuosity assumption (i.e., k-QR)
when q ≡ 3 (mod 4). When q ≡ 1 (mod 4), it additionally requires the k-SJS assumption.
6 More Efficient Lossy Trapdoor Functions from the k-Quadratic Residuosity
Assumption
In this section, we show that our homomorphic cryptosystem allows constructing a lossy trapdoor
function based on the k-QR, k-SJS and DDH assumptions (or on the k-QR and DDH assumptions)
with much shorter outputs and keys than in previous QR-based or DDH-based examples.
In comparison with the function of Hemenway and Ostrovsky [HO12], for example, its output
is k times smaller when working with a modulus N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ). Moreover, the size
of the evaluation key is decreased by a factor of O(k2) while increasing the lossiness by more than
k bits. Finally, our inversion trapdoor has constant size, whereas [HO12] uses a trapdoor of size
O(n) to recover n-bit inputs. Our function also compares favorably with the QR-based function of
Freeman et al. [FGK+10,FGK+13], which only loses a single bit.
In fact, by appropriately tuning our construction, we obtain the first lossy trapdoor function with
short outputs, description and trapdoor that loses many input bits and relies on another assumption
than Paillier’s. Among known lossy trapdoor functions based on traditional number-theoretic
assumptions [PW08,BFO08,FGK+10,FGK+13,KOS10,HO12,MY10], this appears as a rare efficiency
tradeoff. To the best of our knowledge, it has only been achieved under the Composite Residuosity
assumption [BFO08,FGK+10,FGK+13] so far.
Interestingly, our LTDF provides similar efficiency improvements to the QR-based deterministic
encryption scheme of Brakerski and Segev [BS11], which also builds on the Hemenway-Ostrovsky
LTDF. Note that the scheme of [BS11] is important in the deterministic encryption literature since it
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is one of the only known schemes providing security in the auxiliary input setting in the standard
model.
6.1 Description and security analysis
We start by recalling the following definition.
Definition 7 ([PW08]). Let κ ∈ N be a security parameter and n : N → N, ` : N → R be non-negative
functions of κ. A collection of (n , `)-lossy trapdoor functions (LTDF) is a tuple of efficient algorithms
(InjGen, LossyGen,Eval, Invert) with the following specifications.
– Sampling an injective function: Given a security parameter κ, the randomized algorithm InjGen(1κ)
outputs the index ek of an injective function of the family and an inversion trapdoor t.
– Sampling a lossy function: Given a security parameter κ, the probabilistic algorithm LossyGen(1κ)
outputs the index ek of a lossy function.
– Evaluation: Given the index of a function ek —produced by either InjGen or LossyGen— and an input
x ∈ {0, 1}n , the evaluation algorithm Eval outputs Fek(x) such that:
• If ek is an output of InjGen, then Fek(·) is an injective function.
• If ek was produced by LossyGen, then Fek(·) has image size 2n−` . In this case, the value n − ` is
called residual leakage.
– Inversion: For any pair (ek, t) produced by InjGen and any input x ∈ {0, 1}n , the inversion algorithm
Invert returns F−1ek (t , Fek(x))  x.
– Security: The two ensembles {ek | (ek, t) ← InjGen(1κ)}κ∈N and {ek | ek ← LossyGen(1κ)}κ∈N are
computationally indistinguishable.
Our construction goes as follows.
Sampling an injective function. Given a security parameter κ, let `N B `N (κ) and k B k(κ) be
parameters determined by κ. Let also n B n(κ) be the desired input length. Algorithm InjGen
defines m  n/k (we assume that k divides n for simplicity) and conducts the following steps.
1. Generate an `N-bit RSA modulus N  pq such that p  2Kp′ + 1 and q  2Lq′ + 1, for odd
prime integers p, q, p′, q′ and with K  k and L ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Choose y R← JN \ QRN at
random.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pick hi in the subgroup of 2k-residues, Rk  {w2k mod N | w ∈ Z∗N }
(of order p′q′), by setting hi  gi2
k mod N for a randomly chosen gi
R← Z∗N .
3. Choose r1 , . . . , rm
R← Zp′q′ and compute a matrix Z  (Zi , j) i , j∈{1,...,m} given by
Z 
*..,
yz1,1 · h1r1 mod N . . . . . . yz1,m · hmr1 mod N
...
...
yzm ,1 · h1rm mod N . . . . . . yzm ,m · hmrm mod N
+//- ,
where (zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} denotes the identity matrix.
The evaluation key is ek B
(
N, (Zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m}
)
and the trapdoor is t B {p , y}.
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Sampling a lossy function. The process followed by LossyGen is identical to the above one but the
matrix (zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} is replaced by the all-zeroes m × m matrix.
Evaluation. Given ek 
(
N, (Zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m}
)
, algorithm Eval parses the input x ∈ {0, 1}n as a vector
of k-bit blocks x˜  (x1 , . . . , xm), with xi ∈ Z2k for each i. Then, it computes and returns
y˜  (y1 , . . . , ym), with y j ∈ Z∗N , where
y˜ 
( m∏
i1
Zi ,1xi mod N, . . . ,
m∏
i1
Zi ,mxi mod N
)

(
y
∑m
i1 zi ,1xi · h1
∑m
i1 rixi mod N, . . . , y
∑m
i1 zi ,mxi · hm
∑m
i1 rixi mod N
)
.
Inversion. Given t  {p , y} and y˜  (y1 , . . . , ym) ∈ ZmN , Invert applies the decryption algorithm of
Section 3.2 to each y j , for j  1 to m. Observe that when (zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} is the identity matrix,(y j
p
)
2k

[(y
p
)
2k
] x j
mods p. From the resulting vector of plaintexts x˜  (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ Z2km , it
recovers the input x ∈ {0, 1}n .
The Hemenway-Ostrovsky construction of [HO12] is slightly different in that, as in the DDH-
based construction of Peikert and Waters [PW08], the evaluation key includes a vector of the form
G  (gr1 , . . . , grm )T , where g ∈ QRN , and the trapdoor is t  (logg (h1), . . . , logg (hm)). In their
scheme, the evaluation algorithm additionally computes
∏m
i1 (g
ri )xi while the inversion algorithm
does not use the factorization of N but rather performs a coordinate-wise ElGamal decryption. Here,
explicitly using the factorization of N in the inversion algorithm makes it possible to process k-bit
blocks at once. In addition, it allows for a very short inversion trapdoor: the inversion algorithm
only needs y and the factorization of N .
We first recall the DDH assumption before giving the security theorem for our new construction.
Definition 8 (Decision Diffie-Hellman, DDH). Given a security parameter κ, let G  〈g〉 be a (multi-
plicatively written) group of order n. The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption for G asserts that
the function AdvDDHD (κ), defined as the distancePr[D(g , ga , gb , gab)  1 | a , b R← Zn] − Pr[D(g , ga , gb , gc)  1 | a , b , c R← Zn]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities are taken over the
experiment of selecting at random a generator g of G and choosing at random a ∈ Zn , b ∈ Zn and c ∈ Zn .
Theorem 4. Let `(κ)  n(κ) − log2(p′q′). The above construction is a (n(κ), `(κ)-LTDF if the Gap
2k-Res assumption holds and if the DDH assumption holds in the subgroup Rk of 2k-th residues.
We recall that N  pq, with p  2Kp′ + 1 and q  2Lq′ + 1. Therefore, we have:
n(κ) − log2(N/2K+L) < `(κ) < n(κ) − log2(N/2K+L) + 1 .
Proof (of Theorem 4).We first prove that lossy functions are indistinguishable from injective functions.
To this end, we consider a sequence of hybrid experiments.We first define an experiment Exp0 which
is an experiment where the key generation algorithm outputs the description of an injective function
with the difference that y is chosen as a 2k-th residue instead of being drawn as y
R← JN \QRN . Clearly,
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under the Gap 2k-Res assumption, Exp0 is computationally indistinguishable from an experiment
where the adversary is given the description of an injective function. Note that although p′q′ is
used to generate the values r j , using the approximate value N/2K+L instead of p′q′ is statistically
indistinguishable. Thus knowing the factorization of N is not necessary in these experiments, and
the Gap 2k-Res assumption can be applied.
Next, for each i? ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we define experiment Expi? as an experiment where y ∈R Rk
and the key generation algorithm outputs a matrix (Zi , j)i , j which encrypts a hybrid matrix (zi , j)i , j
whose first i? columns all contain zeroes whereas the last m − i? columns are those of the m × m
identity matrix.
Claim. If the DDH assumption holds in the subgroup Rk of 2k-th residues, for each i? ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
experiment Expi? is computationally indistinguishable from Experiment Expi?−1.
Proof. The claim is proved in the same way as a similar claim about the DDH-based LTDF of
Peikert andWaters [PW08]. Since y lives in the cyclic subgroupRk of 2k-th residues,we are free
to invoke theDDH assumption in Rk . Concretely, given aDDH challenge (g , ga , gb , γ) ∈ (Rk )4,
the goal is to distinguish if γ  gab or γ
R← Rk . Let B be an adversary that can tell apart
Expi? from Expi?−1 with advantage
AdvExp(i
?,i?−1)
B (κ) :
Pr[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j)  1 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R← Expi?]
− Pr[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j)  1 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R← Expi?−1]  .
Our distinguisherD is defined as follows. The public key is generated by setting hi?  ga
and h j  gα j , with α j
R← Zp′q′ for each j , i?. The evaluation key is generated by setting the
entry (i?, i?) of the matrix as Zi?,i?  yβγ for a random bit β
R← {0, 1}, while the rest of the
i?-th row is obtained by setting Zi?, j  (gb)α j . The rest of rows of matrix (Zi , j)i , j , different
from the i?-th one, are generated by choosing the exponents faithfully; namely for each
i , i?: Zi , j  h jri for each j , i, Z j, j  h jr j for each j < i? and Z j, j  y · h jr j for each j > i?,
with r j
R← Zp′q′ for each j , i?. Element y ∈ Rk and matrix (Zi , j)i , j are given to B, which
returns its guess β′ on the running experiment. Distinguisher D outputs 1 if β′  β and 0
otherwise.
Suppose first that γ  gab . Then it is clear that the evaluation key given to B is distributed
as in Experiment Expi? when β  0 and as in Experiment Expi?−1 when β  1. Hence,
we have Pr[D(g , ga , gb , γ)  1 | γ  gab]  Pr[β′  β | γ  gab]  12 Pr
[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j) 
0 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R← Expi?
]
+
1
2 Pr
[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j)  1 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R← Expi?−1]  12 (1 −
Pr
[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j)  1 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R← Expi?] ) + 12 Pr[B (y , (Zi , j)i , j)  1 | (y , (Zi , j)i , j) R←
Expi?−1
]

1
2 ± AdvExp(i
?,i?−1)
B (κ). If now γ
R← Rk then Expi? and Expi?−1 are equally
distributed. This implies that Pr[D(g , ga , gb , γ)  1 | γ R← Rk]  Pr[β′  β | γ R← Rk]  1/2.
Consequently, we get Pr[D(g , ga , gb , γ)  1 | γ  gab] − Pr[D(g , ga , gb , γ)  1 | γ R←
Rk]  AdvExp(i?,i?−1)B (κ), which should be negligible under the DDH assumption. 
The proof now follows by remarking that, in lossy functions, the output is entirely determined
by
∑m
i1 rixi mod p′q′, so that the image size is smaller than p′q′. The residual leakage is thus at
most log2(p′q′) bits. uunionsq
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Combining this result with Theorem 3, the security of the new trapdoor function relies on the
DDH assumption in the subgroup of 2k-th residues and additionally either the combination of the
k-QR and k-SJS assumptions (when L > 1) or the k-QR assumption alone (when L  1).
It is worth noting that, with N  pq such that p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ), a side effect of working in
the subgroup Rk (of order p′q′) is an improved lossiness. Indeed, we lose n − log2(p′q′) bits in
comparison with n − log2 φ(N) in [HO12]. Since φ(N)  2K+Lp′q′, this means we lose K + L more
bits than by using the construction in [HO12], where K  k, 1 ≤ L ≤ k.
The most interesting instantiations are:
– K  L  k: in which case we lose 2k more bits than [HO12] and the construction is secure under
k-QR, k-SJS, and DDH in Rk ;
– K  k and L  1: in which case we lose only k more bits than [HO12], but the k-SJS assumption
is no more required.
6.2 An all-but-one trapdoor function
Using the techniques of Peikert and Waters [PW08], it is easy to construct an equally efficient
all-but-one trapdoor function providing the same amount of lossiness as our lossy trapdoor function,
under the same assumptions. A difference will be that, in order to enable inversion, the resulting
all-but-one function will handle k/2 bits (instead of k) in each chunk.
Firstwe recall the definition of an all-but-one trapdoor function. Let κ ∈ N be a security parameter
and n : N→ N, ` : N→ R be non-negative functions of κ. A collection of (n , `)-all-but-one trapdoor
functions (ABO-TDF) is a tuple of efficient algorithms (BranchGen,ABOGen,Eval, Invert) with the
following specifications.
– Sampling a branch: Given a security parameter κ, BranchGen is a randomized algorithm that
outputs a branch b ∈ {0, 1}∗ of appropriate length.
– Sampling a function:ABOGen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security parameter κ
and a branch b? produced by BranchGen. It outputs the description ek of a function and a
trapdoor t.
– Evaluation: For any branch b? produced by BranchGen, any pair (ek , t) produced by ABOGen(1κ ,
b?), any branch b and any input x ∈ {0, 1}n , the evaluation algorithm Eval outputs Fb ,ek(x) such
that:
• If b , b?, then Fb ,ek(·) is an injective function;
• If b  b?, then Fb?,ek(·) has image size 2n−` . In this case, the value n − ` is called residual
leakage.
– Inversion: For any b? produced by BranchGen and any pair (ek, t) produced by ABOGen(1κ , b?),
any branch b , b? and any input x ∈ {0, 1}n , the inversion algorithm Invert returns F−1b ,ek(t ,
Fb ,ek(x))  x.
– Security: For any distinct b , b′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ produced by BranchGen, the ensembles
{ek | (ek, t) ← ABOGen(1κ , b)}κ∈N and {ek | (ek, t) ← ABOGen(1κ , b′)}κ∈N
are computationally indistinguishable.
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Our ABO-TDF is described below. A difference with the Paillier-based construction of [FGK+10]
is that, when inverting the function, we must pay attention to the fact that the output of the function
may contain encryptions of values which are not invertible modulo 2k . In order to avoid the need to
invert in Z2k , we perform the division over the integers. To this end, we have to adjust the parameter
k so as to make sure that, for any branches b , b? and any input block x, the product (b − b?) · x will
be smaller than 2k .
Sampling a branch. Given a security parameter κ ∈ N and a parameter λ B λ(κ) determined by κ,
the algorithm chooses b
R← {0, 1}λ.
Sampling a function. The function sampling algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ,
parameters ` B `N (κ) and λ B λ(κ) that are determined by κ, the desired input length
n B n(κ), and a branch b? ∈ {0, 1}λ. It sets k  2λ and defines m  n/λ (we assume that λ
divides n for simplicity) and does the following.
1. Generate an `N-bit RSA modulus N  pq such that p  2Kp′ + 1 and q  2Lq′ + 1, for odd
prime integers p , q , p′, q′, K  k, and some L ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Choose y R← JN \QRN at random.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pick hi in the subgroup Rk (of order p′q′), by setting hi  gi2k mod N
for a randomly chosen gi
R← Z∗N .
3. Choose r1 , . . . , rm
R← Zp′q′ and compute a matrix
Z 
(
Zi , j
)
i , j∈{1,...,m} 
*..,
y−z1,1b? · h1r1 mod N . . . . . . yz1,m · hmr1 mod N
...
...
yzm ,1 · h1rm mod N . . . . . . y−zm ,mb? · hmrm mod N
+//- ,
where
(
zi , j
)
i , j∈{1,...,m} is the identity matrix; i.e., Zi ,i  y−b
?
hiri mod N and Zi , j  h jri mod N
if j , i.
The evaluation key of the ABO function is ek B
(
N, (Zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} , y
)
and the trapdoor is t B p.
Evaluation. In order to evaluate the function on a branch b ∈ {0, 1}λ for the input x ∈ {0, 1}n using
the evaluation key ek 
(
N, (Zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} , y
)
, algorithm Eval parses x ∈ {0, 1}n as a vector of
λ-bit blocks x˜  (x1 , . . . , xm), with xi ∈ Z2λ for each i. Then, it defines the matrix
Zb  (Zbi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m}

*.....,
yb · Z1,1 mod N Z1,2 . . . Z1,m
Z2,1 yb · Z2,2 mod N . . . Z2,m
...
. . .
...
Zm ,1 . . . . . . yb · Zm ,m mod N
+/////-
,
i.e., Zbi , j  Zi , j if i , j and Z
b
i ,i  y
b ·Zi ,i mod N for each i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then, it computes and
returns
y˜ 
( m∏
i1
(Zbi ,1)
xi mod N, . . . ,
m∏
i1
(Zbi ,m)
xi mod N
)

(
y (b−b?)x1 · h1
∑m
i1 rixi mod N, . . . , y (b−b?)xm · hm
∑m
i1 rixi mod N
)
.
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Inversion. Given a description ek 
(
N, (Zi , j)i , j∈{1,...,m} , y
)
of the function, the trapdoor t  p
and the output y˜  (y1 , . . . , ym) ∈ ZmN , the function can be inverted for the branch b , b? by
proceeding as follows.
1. Define the vector (w1 , . . . ,wm) ∈ ZmN as (w1 , . . . ,wm)  (y1 , . . . , ym) if b > b? (when the
bitstrings b and b? are interpreted as natural integers) and (w1 , . . . ,wm)  (y1−1 mod
N, . . . , ym−1 mod N) if b < b?.
2. For i  1 to m, apply the decryption algorithm of Section 3.2 to wi .
3. From the vector of plaintexts x˜  (x1 , . . . , xm) ∈ Zm2λ obtained at Step 2, define x˜′ 
(x′1 , . . . , x
′
m) ∈ Zm2λ such that x′i  xi/|b − b?| (the division being performed over Z), where|b − b?|  b − b? if b > b? and b? − b otherwise.
4. From x˜′  (x′1 , . . . , x
′
m), recover the original input x ∈ {0, 1}n by concatenating the binary
representations the coordinates of x˜′.
The correctness of the inversion algorithm stems from the fact that, since we have xi , b , b? < 2λ,
it holds that |b − b?| · xi < 22λ  2k for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, so that x′i can be computed over the
integers at step 3 of the inversion algorithm.
It is easy to prove that the description of the function computationally hides the underlying
lossy branch if the k-QR and k-SJS assumptions hold (when L > 1) or if the k-QR assumption holds
(when L  1), and if the DDH assumption holds in the subgroup Rk (of order p′q′). The proof is
essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 4 and is omitted.
6.3 Application: Efficient CCA-secure encryption
By combining the lossy and all-but-one trapdoor function, a CCA-secure encryption scheme can be
obtained using the construction of [PW08]. We argue now that m  O(1) suffices for this purpose.
Recall that the scheme of [PW08] combines a pairwise independent hash function H : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}τ, an (n , `)-lossy function and an (n , `′)-all-but-one function such that ` + `′ ≥ n + ν and
τ ≥ ν − 2 log2(1/ε), for some ν ∈ ω(log n) and where ε is the statistical distance in the modified
Leftover Hash Lemma used in [DRS04]. If we choose ε ≈ 2−κ and τ  k in order to encrypt k-bit
messages, we can set ν  k + 2κ. Setting `  `′  n − log2(p′q′), the constraint ` + `′ ≥ n + ν
translates into n − 2 log2(p′q′) ≥ ν.
Since q  2Lq′ + 1 and p  2kp′ + 1 in our trapdoor functions, if we set k  14 log2 N − κ (cf.
Section 5.1), we have log2(p′q′)  log2 φ(N) − k − L ≈ 4(k + κ) − k − L  3k + 4κ − L, which yields
n ≥ 4k + 6κ − L. If k > κ, it is sufficient to set n ≥ 10k. If we take into account the fact that our
all-but-one function processes blocks of k/2 bits, we find that m  2n/k  20 suffices here, even for
L  1. For larger values of L, an even smaller m would suffice.
As it turns out, when the Peikert-Waters construction [PW08, Section 4.3] of CCA-secure
encryption is instantiated with our lossy and all-but-one trapdoor functions, it only requires a
constant number of exponentiations while retaining constant-size public keys and ciphertexts.
With the exception of [HKS13] (which relies on a weaker assumption), to the best of our knowl-
edge, it yields the only known CCA-secure QR-based cryptosystem combining the aforementioned
efficiency properties. Up to now, the most efficient chosen-ciphertext-secure cryptosystem strictly
based on the QR assumption was the one of Kiltz et al. [KPSY09], where O(κ) exponentiations
are needed to encrypt and the public key contains O(κ) group elements. On the other hand,
our construction requires more specific moduli than [KPSY09] and additionally appeals to the
DDH assumption (and the k-SJS assumption, as well, if L > 1).
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7 Conclusion
This paper introduced a new generalization of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. The so-obtained
cryptosystems are shown to be secure under well-defined assumptions. Further, they enjoy a number
of useful features including fast decryption, optimal ciphertext expansion, and homomorphic
property. We believe that our proposal is the most natural yet efficient generalization of the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. It keeps the nice attributes and properties of the original scheme
while improving the overall performance.
When applied to the Peikert-Waters framework for building lossy trapdoor functions, it yields a
practical construction based onquadratic-residuosity related andDDH assumptions,with companion
deterministic encryption scheme and CCA-secure cryptosystem.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Theorem 3, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, we consider the subsets Di of JN given by
Di 
{
y2
i mod N | y ∈ JN \QRN }
and define the subgroup of 2k-th residues, Rk 
{
y2
k mod N | y ∈ Z∗N
}
.
We start with a lemma that is useful to tighten the bound of Theorem 3 in the case q ≡ 3
(mod 4).
Lemma 2. Let N  pq be the product of two large primes p and q where p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) for some k ≥ 1
and q ≡ 3 (mod 4). Then, for any w ∈ QRN , lettingW B w2i−1 mod N for a given 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have
W ∈ Rk ∪⋃k−1ji D j . Further, if w is uniform over QRN , we haveW uniform over D j with probability 12 j−i+1
for i ≤ j ≤ k − 1 andW uniform over Rk with probability 12k−i .
Proof. We assume that w is uniform over QRN .
The case i  k (which includes the case k  1) yieldsW  w2k−1 with w ∈ QRN . It is then readily
verified thatW is uniform over Rk with probability 1.
We henceforth suppose i ≤ k − 1 and k ≥ 2. In particular, this implies p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and thus(−1
p
)
 1. Denoting by (wˆp , wˆq) the CRT representation of a square root wˆ of w (i.e., wˆp  wˆ mod p
and wˆq  w mod q), the four square roots of w modulo N are given by (±wˆp ,±wˆq). Since
(−1
q
)
 −1,
we can assume w.l.o.g. that
(
wˆq
q
)

(
wˆp
p
)
, or equivalently that wˆ ∈ JN . If wˆ ∈ QRN the process
can be re-iterated, and so on. More generally, we define t as the largest integer in {1, . . . , k − i}
such that w  wˆ2t for some wˆ ∈ JN . We can so write W  wˆ2t+i−1 for some wˆ ∈ JN . It is worth
noting that since t is the largest integer in the set {1, . . . , k − i} we can only have wˆ ∈ QRN when
t  k − i. Defining j  t + i − 1 (observe that i ≤ j ≤ k − 1), we therefore obtain W  wˆ2 j ∈ D j
if wˆ < QRN (i.e., wˆ ∈ JN \ QRN) and W  wˆ2k−1 ∈ Rk if wˆ ∈ QRN . The probability that W ∈ D j
(for i ≤ j ≤ k − 1) is Pr[w  wˆ2t and wˆ < QRN]  12t  12 j−i+1 and the probability that W ∈ Rk is
Pr[W <
⋃k−1
ji D j]  1 −
∑k−1
ji
1
2 j−i+1 
1
2k−i . uunionsq
Theorem 5. For RSA moduli N  pq with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4), the Gap 2k-Residuosity
Gap 2k-Res assumption holds if the k-QR assumption holds. More precisely, for any probabilistic polyno-
mial-time distinguisher B against the latter, there exists a k-QR distinguisherD with comparable running
time and for which
AdvGap 2
k -Res
B (κ) ≤ 12 (k + 1) ·Advk-QRD (κ) .
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Proof. Let B be an adversary against Gap 2k-Res. We write:
i 
Pr[B(x ,N)  1 | x
R← Di] for i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
Pr[B(x ,N)  1 | x R← Rk] for i  k
.
The advantage of B against Gap 2k-Res is given by AdvGap 2k -ResB (κ)  |0 − k |.
We first construct k distinguishers B1 , . . . ,Bk against k-QR as follows. Bi takes as input an
RSA modulus N  pq, with p ≡ 1 (mod 2k ) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4), and an element w ∈ JN . Its task
is to decide whether w is uniform over JN \ QRN or uniform over QRN . To this end, Bi chooses
a random element z
R← Z∗N , defines x  z2
i
w2
i−1 mod N, and feeds B with (x ,N). It outputs the
answer returned by B. There are two cases:
– If w is uniform over JN \QRN , we clearly have that x is uniform over Di−1. Therefore, in that
case, Bi outputs 1with probability i−1.
– If w is uniform over QRN , B outputs 1 with probability ∑kji 12 j−i+1  j + 12k−i k , according to
Lemma 2.
Therefore, the (signed) advantage of Bi in solving k-QR is
ai  i−1 − *.,
k∑
ji
1
2 j−i+1
 j +
1
2k−i
k
+/-  i−1 −
k∑
ji
2i−1β j j
with β j  12 j for j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and βk  12k−1 .
Consider the following probability distribution P over {1, . . . , k}:
Pr
X
R←P
[X  i]  pi B

2
k+1 if i  1
1
k+1 if i ≥ 2
.
We now define an adversaryD against k-QR as follows:D chooses a random element i R← P and
feeds Bi with its k-QR challenge. The advantage ofD is equal to
Advk-QRD (κ) 

k∑
i1
piai
 

k∑
i1
pii−1 −
k∑
i1
pi
k∑
ji
2i−1β j j
 

k−1∑
j0
p j+1 j −
k∑
j1
j∑
i1
2i−1piβ j j


p10 +
k−1∑
j1
(
p j+1 −
j∑
i1
2i−1piβ j
)
 j −
k∑
i1
2i−1piβkk
 .
For j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, we have β j  12 j and thus
j∑
i1
2i−1piβ j 
(
p1 +
j∑
i2
2i−1pi
)
β j 
(
2 +
j∑
i2
2i−1
)
β j
k + 1  2
j β j
k + 1 
1
k + 1  p j+1 .
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Likewise, since βk  12k−1 , we have
k∑
i1
2i−1piβk 
(
p1 +
k∑
i2
2i−1pi
)
βk  2k
βk
k + 1 
2
k + 1 .
Therefore, we get that the advantage ofD satisfies
Advk-QRD (κ) 
 2k + 10 + 0 − 2k + 1k   2k + 1 AdvGap 2k -ResB (κ) .
This concludes the proof by further noting that the running time ofD is comparable to that ofB. uunionsq
Theorem 2 is now an application of Theorem 5, in a way similar to what was done in Section 4.3
for the general case.
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